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460      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
palling 55 percent casualty rate as a result — the highest of any regi-
ment in the battle. Fields of Blood is an excellent study of an important 
but often overlooked campaign and is a welcome addition to the lit-
erature on the Trans-Mississippi Theater.  
 
 
The American Military Frontiers: The United States Army in the West, 1783–
1900, by Robert Wooster. Histories of the American Frontier. Albuquer-
que: University of New Mexico Press, 2009. xvi, 361 pp. Illustrations, 
maps, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth. 
Reviewer J. Thomas Murphy is associate professor of history at Bemidji State 
University. His dissertation (University of Illinois, 1993) was “Pistols Legacy: 
Sutlers, Post Traders, and the American Army, 1820–1895.” 
During congressional debates to determine army appropriations in 
1878, Montana’s territorial delegate, Martin Maginnis, spoke favorably 
of the U.S. Army’s contribution in advancing the nation westward, 
while U.S. Representative Auburn L. Pridemore of Virginia thought 
otherwise. “It has been the tiller of the soil,” countered the former 
Confederate soldier, “who stood with loaded gun in his own field who 
has made his way through the savage land” (274). Pridemore’s argu-
ment bore the memory of a Yankee army ruling over the South during 
Reconstruction, but it reflected other long-standing values: the Revolu-
tionary generation’s discomfort with maintaining a large standing 
army, the Jacksonian desire for a limited government, and the Ameri-
can belief in self-reliance and individual opportunity. Such ideas min-
imized a federal role, and the dispute appeared time and again, yet as 
Robert Wooster makes clear, the army became the “government’s most 
visible agent of empire” (xii). Militias and state-sponsored volunteers 
contributed to American expansion, fighting at Tippecanoe with Wil-
liam Henry Harrison in 1811 and following Alexander Doniphan into 
Mexico in 1847, but despite a parsimonious Congress and a tradition 
limiting the army’s numbers, primary responsibility fell to regulars led 
by officers trained at West Point. 
 This imperial thesis is hardly new, having been established a gen-
eration ago by Robert G. Athearn, Francis Paul Prucha, and Robert Ut-
ley, but recent historians have continued to refine it, and this volume 
employs a remarkable depth of scholarship and primary sources to de-
scribe the army’s role from the earliest days of the nation to the end of 
the nineteenth century. During that time, soldiers explored and mapped 
the West, built forts and roads, protected the borders and “participated 
in over eleven hundred combat operations against Indians” (273).  
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 Wooster begins with the push to secure the Ohio Valley from the 
Miami. His narrative tracks the principal Indian wars that followed, 
but this is not a simple rehash of battles lost and won. Instead, Woos-
ter tells a wider story of political squabbles, economic opportunity, 
institutional reforms, and policies that left the army and its officer 
corps whipsawed by public expectations. In 1836 Brevet Major Gen-
eral Edmund P. Gaines, an expansionist and as ethnocentric as anyone 
on the frontier, disagreed with the decision “to break up the Indians, 
take their lands and throw together twenty tribes speaking different 
languages.” He preferred to treat them humanely. “Otherwise we must 
annihilate them. This we cannot do without forgetting what is due to 
our own interests, and our own self-respect” (63–64). The popular in-
sistence on Indian defeat and displacement caused the army to keep 
nearly one-third of its forces in Florida fighting Seminoles during the 
period 1821–1835, and it encouraged a series of shameful depredations 
in the post–Civil War West. After troops under Major Eugene M. Baker 
attacked a friendly Piegan village and killed a large number of women 
and children in 1870, the reformer Wendell Phillips derided Baker 
along with Generals Philip H. Sheridan and George A. Custer as the 
true “savages upon the Plains” (209). 
 A military presence anywhere on the frontier guaranteed an influx 
of capital because the army needed supplies for its soldiers, forage for 
its horses, and a civilian work force to be construction laborers, team-
sters, and woodcutters. This financial relationship engendered re-
gional development, a persistent theme among imperial historians, 
and Wooster recognizes its importance for understanding the army’s 
ultimate contribution. J. M. D. Burrows, a merchant in Davenport, 
Iowa, began supplying Fort Crawford in 1841. “I always considered 
this as the best and most successful operation I ever undertook,” he 
remembered, “and it benefited Scott County as much as it did me, as 
the money I obtained was scattered all over the county paying for 
produce” (72). Fifty years later, editors of the San Antonio Express wel-
comed “over a million dollars annually” from troops in its city (271).  
 Wooster’s study covers a lot of ground, and while his text can 
seem overstuffed, it is readable, thoughtful, and informative. He in-
cludes an extensive bibliography, thorough notes, and seven maps that 
help readers follow his discussion. Overall, this is a fine work; anyone 
interested in the military in the American West can either build a siz-
able library or simply read this book.  
 
 
